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Criminal Justice Policy Strategies for Maine
Maine Policy Review (1996). Volume 5, Number 3
Are we controlling crime in ways that may lead to reductions in crime rates as well as a criminal
justice system that is more cost-efficient for Mainers to support? McEwen and Hanneman
indicate we are not and ask the question: Can we take advantage of our relatively low crime rate
to rethink and improve crime control strategies? In answering this question McEwen and
Hanneman present a forceful argument for restorative justice, where repairing the harm to
victims and communities becomes the forefront of our response to crime. They suggest six
strategies to achieve this change, including the planned closing of the Maine State Prison.
by Craig McEwen and
Evelyn Hanneman
Introduction
During the 1990s Maine has remained relatively immune from the hysteria about violent crime
that has played a prominent role in political campaigns and driven policy and spending decisions
in many states. At one extreme, for example, prison populations in California have expanded by
almost 600 percent between 1979 and 1994 while spending for corrections has grown from less
than 4 percent of the state budget--roughly Maine’s current rate--to more than 10 percent, now
outstripping expenditures for higher education (Schiraldi, 1994). During the same period,
California’s violent crime rate increased by 66 percent. Maine stands in stark contrast. With a
1994 violent crime rate about one-eighth the size of California’s and essentially the same as it
was in 1979, Maine’s prison population grew by 90 percent during that period but now is
relatively stable, unlike in California where the rate is projected to triple during the next decade.
Since crime rates in Maine remain low, criminal justice expenditures appear under control, and
prison populations are projected to rise only modestly due to a recent reduction in the amount of
"good time" granted to reduce time served, why should criminal justice policy be a priority in
this state? One reason is to avoid the policy choices of California, which could bankrupt itself
with its prison expansion program. Second, although violent crime rates are relatively low in
Maine, they remain of concern to citizens here and cannot be ignored. Third, criminal justice
policy is especially challenging because it must bridge the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches; connect state, county, and town or city government; and be coordinated with other
social agencies and policies. Finally, Maine--by the very fact of its modest crime problems-provides an opportunity to think innovatively about criminal justice policy in ways that could
help provide a national model.
Such innovative thinking cannot be bound by conventional assumptions about crime control that
expect far more of the criminal justice system than it can deliver. Further, such thinking requires
at its center a new paradigm for justice--restorative justice--to replace the retributive model for
criminal justice that now dominates policy. Freed from past assumptions, policy makers can

design policies that emphasize reparation of harm to victims and communities and acknowledge
the crucial role of conventional social institutions--family, work, school, and community--in
shaping the behavior of people who find rewards through participation in them. Proposals to
enhance community policing, increase the use of intermediate sanctions, improve capabilities for
meaningful rehabilitation, develop targeted community crime prevention, and respond
effectively to the harm done to victims would both advance restorative justice as well as
strengthen these crucial controls, and thus promise success in controlling crime rates. To
succeed, these proposals would require greater coordination among criminal justice and other
state and local agencies and funding that might be obtained in part by a carefully planned closing
of the Maine State Prison.
Rethinking the Purpose and Limits of Criminal Justice
Criminal justice policy presumably advances two central public purposes--control of crime and
justice. Powerful assumptions about how crime can be controlled and about what justice means
drive contemporary criminal justice policy, making it increasingly expensive at the same time it
proves itself ineffective. Any efforts to rethink criminal justice policy in Maine require that we
examine and challenge these assumptions.
The primary, or even exclusive burden for controlling crime typically is placed on the police,
courts, and corrections system. Yet, it is easy to overestimate the power of government
intervention to control individual behavior. In fact, a quick glance at some of the experiences
nationally and in Maine suggests these limits. In the period from 1979 to 1994, the United States
tripled the number of people it imprisoned. Yet, the FBI’s annual Crime in the United States
shows that the rate of reported violent crime grew by 30 percent during the same period while
the rate of property crime fell by only 6 percent. The dramatic and unprecedented increase in the
use of imprisonment--arising from longer prison sentences and greater proportions of offenders
sentenced to prison--appears on the surface not to have had a clear downward effect on crime
rates. Why not?
If changes in the criminal justice system--defined primarily as making it "tougher"--are to control
crime rates, that effect must be achieved largely through increases in deterrence or
incapacitation. On one hand, punishing criminals presumably "sends a message" to other
potential lawbreakers and thus deters future crime. On the other hand, people kept under
correctional supervision are not free to engage in criminal activity in the community. Certainly,
the presence of a criminal justice system acts both to provide some deterrence and some
incapacitation while also teaching and reinforcing moral lessons about right and wrong conduct.
But the crucial policy question is not whether the system deters or incapacitates at all, but
whether changes in that system significantly increase or decrease deterrence or incapacitation
and thus have clear effects on crime rates.
Limits of Deterrence
Those who study deterrence generally agree that 1) punishment that is highly likely deters more
than punishment that is unlikely; 2) severe punishment deters more than less severe punishment;
and 3) punishment that is administered as soon after the act it punishes as possible will deter

better than punishment administered at a more distant time (Andenaes, 1974). Of these three, the
first--certainty of punishment--is understood as by far the most significant. Unfortunately, it also
proves to be the most difficult to change radically. In the United States, for example, only thirtytwo of every 1,000 serious crimes lead to conviction (Senna and Siegel, 1995)--largely because
in 90 percent of felonies the crimes either are not reported to the police or the police cannot
identify the offender (Petersilia, 1992). Prosecutors then screen out and dismiss cases with
insufficient evidence. Popular perceptions aside, courts convict the vast majority of offenders
prosecuted--95 percent of Classes A, B, and C cases in Maine in 1992 and 1993 (Judicial
Branch, 1993). The biggest barriers to certainty of punishment--non-reporting and unsolved
crimes-- are especially difficult to overcome. It is doubtful the likelihood of punishment can be
increased substantially without resorting to police-state tactics we would find intolerable in the
United States.
Increasing the severity of punishment is much easier to accomplish than increases in certainty. In
fact, prison sentences in Maine (Market Decisions, 1993) and elsewhere are significantly longer
in the 1990s than even a decade earlier. But will marginal increases in severity improve
deterrence? Probably very little. First, for many people severity has little significance. Most of us
who have much to lose with a criminal conviction do not care whether the penalty is one month
or ten years. Any conviction would be shameful and stigmatizing. Individuals who live in strong
and stable communities and experience success in family, school, and work are likely to fear the
loss of respect coming from arrest and conviction far more than the punishment that might
follow.
For people with much less to lose, the differences in severity of punishment also appear to matter
little (Petersilia, 1992). The circumstances of many crimes make it unlikely that people will
anticipate carefully the likelihood and severity of punishment by the state before they act or that
they will weigh possible punishments more heavily than the short-term results of criminal acts.
For example, more than half the violent offenders in state prisons reported committing their
offenses while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992).
Further, the circumstances of offending appear to restrict the attention of many offenders to the
short-run consequences of their acts--for example, to getting money for a drug habit or to
maintain status and respect among their peers--when engaging in criminal activity, and reduce
the chance of considering remote and uncertain legal consequences (see, e.g. Wright and Decker,
1994). In addition, to the extent someone might anticipate severe penalties, they easily can be
discounted by the assumption that he or she will not be caught. Finally, for those people with the
least to lose, criminal punishment itself holds little fear because its stigma is meaningless and its
conditions, however harsh, differ little from those of their unhappy lives. Thus, a wide range of
forces significantly diminish the effects on crime rates of marginal increases in severity of
punishment.
Limits of Incapacitation
Control of crime rates by marginal increases in deterrence is difficult to achieve, but
incapacitation would seem to be a sure thing. The criminal justice system certainly has some
downward effect on crime by keeping more and more offenders under correctional control, but
the capacity to affect crime rates meaningfully has substantial limits (Zimring and Hawkins,

1995). These limits result largely from the fact that the social forces that help produce and
reproduce crime quickly replace many of those people who are removed from communities
through imprisonment. The sorts of crime that foster the greatest public concern are largely the
work of young men. Boys replace those who are imprisoned almost as fast as they are convicted.
Individuals typically do not receive long prison sentences until they are in their early to midtwenties or older, a period during their life course when many are maturing out of crime as they
take on jobs and accept family responsibilities (Petersilia, 1992). Thus, the turn to longer and
longer sentences during the past decade results in the lengthy incarceration of many people who
are apt to have relatively low offending rates in the future. As a result, incapacitation turns out to
be a very expensive strategy with surprisingly little effect on crime rates. Yet its general failure
as a long-term crime control strategy does not mean incapacitation is inappropriate or ineffective
when used selectively for multiple offenders whose crimes--like drug sales--will not simply be
replaced by others.
A policy to control crime rates through deterrence and incapacitation inevitably fails and
promotes an endless spiral of escalating penalties, prison populations, and expenditures for
criminal justice (Clear, 1994). Failure builds support for harsher penalties and more prisons
under the assumption that the inability to control crime rates arises not from the false premises of
the policy but from the limited character of its implementation. In this sense, prisons breed new
prisons. California has embarked on this path. Recall that its 600 percent increase in prisoners
during a sixteen-year period has been accompanied by a 66 percent increase in reports of violent
crime.
Unlike California, Maine generally has steered clear of policies built largely on the overstated
hopes for deterrence and incapacitation. Nonetheless, prison populations almost doubled over ten
years in Maine as prison sentences were lengthened. These shifts generally don’t seem to have
made Maine safer but have cost substantial sums of money, since taxpayers pay about $25,000 to
imprison a person for one year in Maine. Public outcry about a particularly heinous crime in
Maine could renew calls for the pursuit of such policies. However, if Maine policy makers want
to have a real effect on crime rates, they would be served better by attending to other approaches,
some of which already are underway in the state.
Retributive or Restorative Justice
The criminal justice system is presumed to deliver justice as well as control crime. Crime offends
us because people break moral and legal rules, threaten and harm others, profit at our expense,
and undermine our trust. In response to such harms, we have attempted to achieve justice largely
through retribution. That view of justice has had little competition until recently, but now is
challenged by an alternative vision of restorative justice that provides a new paradigm for the
criminal justice system.
Retributive justice entails punishing offenders in ways that presumably balance the wrong done
to the individuals, organizations, and communities that have been victimized. The currency of
retribution is severity of punishment. The greater the severity, the greater the retribution. Recent
extensions of prison sentences in Maine--for example the doubling of the upper limit for
sentences for Class A crimes from twenty to forty years in 1989--and the 90 percent increase in

the state prison population during the 1980s reflect this retributive approach.1 Even if such
increases do not diminish crime rates effectively through enhanced deterrence or incapacitation,
they may satisfy a public urge for retributive justice.
Unfortunately, retributive justice also has economic and social costs. As Californians are
discovering, retribution is very expensive, and we in Maine need to weigh carefully the tradeoffs
between longer punishment at $25,000 per person per year and other uses for scarce public
dollars. The social costs of retribution are less clear but perhaps even more worrisome in the long
run. Retribution enlists the state as an agent of private vengeance and emphasizes the imposition
of pain as a public good. It turns our collective focus on crime to the contest between the state
and the alleged offender over culpability while neglecting efforts to assist individual victims. It
highlights the small minority of crimes that lead to an arrest and tends to ignore the much larger
number for which no offender is identified. It emphasizes the individual offender to the
exclusion of the community and social context of crime. Because most offenders plead guilty
without trial, they never have to face their victims or recognize the human costs of their crime.
By stigmatizing and alienating offenders, retribution can make their successful return to
communities more difficult. Finally, a retributive approach has no built-in limits and easily can
lead to an unchecked escalation in severity of punishment.
Until recently, there was no coherent set of principles to provide a plausible alternative to
retributive justice. A restorative justice approach, however, has increasing visibility in the United
States and has been adopted as one of the guiding principles of the Maine Department of
Corrections. Restorative justice includes punishment and incapacitation of offenders but focuses
less attention on the offender and more on the harm done by crime and the need to repair it. The
primary questions in a retributive system are: "What laws were broken?" "Who did this?" or
"What should the punishment be?" These change in a restorative system to: "Who was hurt?"
"What is needed to repair the hurt?" and "Who is responsible to repair the hurt?" (Zehr, 1990).
Thus, the harm and the victim are at the center of the restorative process. A restorative justice
approach encourages attention to the many crimes in which offenders are not identified as well
as to the few where they are discovered.
The measure of restorative justice is not the amount of punishment imposed but rather the extent
to which the harm to individuals and to communities is repaired. Restorative justice further
emphasizes the direct accountability of the offender to the victim--not just to the state through
appropriate punishment--through acknowledgment of wrong, remorse, and shame, through
payment of restitution, and through community service. This approach also leaves room for those
victims who desire to meet with offenders in structured settings to express their anger, fear, and
loss, and also to learn to understand the offender and offense and, if they can, to move toward
forgiveness as a way of gaining closure in the aftermath of the crime. In the restorative justice
view, the community must play a central role in assisting crime victims, holding offenders
accountable, reintegrating offenders into the community, and taking responsibility for preventing
future crime. Reconciliation and forgiveness are central principles of restorative justice because
they imply that breaks in the community fabric have been repaired as offenders take
responsibility for the harm they have done and that they and the community have done as much
as is within their power to repair those harms.

The restorative justice model helps to free policy makers from the trap laid by an exclusive
reliance on a retributive approach. In that latter view, the central response to the very real
problems of crime and victimization are ever harsher punishments that presumably appease the
victim and prevent future crimes. The failure of a retributive system to deliver significantly
greater public safety is overlooked. The system also leaves many victims unsatisfied, in part
because punishment may do little to resolve their problems and because most victimizations
never lead to an arrest and punishment. A restorative justice model provides an alternative
approach that advances important public values and supports policies that promise greater
effectiveness in controlling crime.
Criminal Justice Policy Strategies for Maine
To identify strategies that have promise to reduce crime rates, one first must identify the causes
of those crimes that most concern citizens and policy makers--violent crimes, drug sales, and
property crimes such as burglary and theft. Those most likely to become involved in such crimes
appear to be young people who have little attachment to their communities. Although the
structure of small communities in Maine limits the extent of such detachment, it still poses a
problem that policy can address. A wider understanding of crime causes leads to policy
proposals that can promote more effective crime control and advance restorative justice.
Understanding the Causes of Crime
To begin to assess the causes of crime, let us return to the comparison between Maine and
California and ask ourselves why crime rates in California are so much higher than those in
Maine. Before answering that question, it is important to observe that in both Maine and
California, the people most likely to find themselves in the criminal justice system are young
men with few resources--low income, weak formal education, unemployed or marginally
employed, and often unmarried (see, e.g. Perkins, 1994). Significant differences in crime rates
between Maine and California, therefore, are likely to reflect differences in the numbers and
concentrations of such young people in the states and in the capacity of their communities to
involve even these most marginal members in the life of the "mainstream."
To explain the differences between Maine and California crime rates, it also helps to recognize
that the most powerful forces that shape individual behavior are families, communities, friends
and peers, schools, and employers. They guide and direct us through rewards of status, security,
respect, love, and income, as well as the threat of their loss. In other words, they create a stake in
conformity. When they offer or deliver few rewards, however, families, employers, schools, and
community institutions have a weaker hold on individuals, who then have a reduced commitment
to conformity. Under these circumstances, the lure and acceptability of illegitimate opportunities
increase.
Crime occurs most often then when these controls are weakened. Large cities, especially of areas
of concentrated poverty, may have the weakest institutions and controls and thus the highest
crime rates. One of the biggest differences between Maine and California, therefore, is the
concentration of residents in our state in smaller communities while California has sixteen cities
with more than 170,000 residents. When considering the reasons for higher crime rates in

California than in Maine, we thus are likely to focus not on differences in criminal justice
policies in the two states but rather on distinctive features of community life.
This comparison suggests that if we accept as a policy objective the reduction of crime rates, we
need to turn our attention largely to strengthening community institutions and widening the
availability of rewards in order to build a larger stake in conformity among those most at risk of
crime involvement. Even in smaller Maine communities, people find themselves estranged from
families, communities, or schools. How can we reduce the likelihood that such estrangement will
occur and lead to crime? Initiatives that connect criminal justice control to the controls available
in communities provide the answer to this question.
Policy Initiatives Connecting a Restorative Criminal Justice to Communities
Those policies most likely to succeed in controlling crime rates are ones that connect the powers
of legal control to the even more powerful social controls in communities, families, work, and
schools. Policies to promote restorative justice also need to involve communities centrally in
repairing harm and holding offenders accountable. A recognition of this need to connect criminal
justice to communities has begun to reshape police departments across the United States through
community policing. This innovative approach to policing provides an important model for other
parts of the criminal justice system.
Community policing generally rests on the assumption that active cooperation between
community residents and police is essential to effective law enforcement and crime prevention.
Thus, community policing practices can help change public understanding about who is
responsible for crime control. In community policing, that task is no longer delegated exclusively
to the police and criminal justice system but is shared by community residents and organizations.
A well- developed community policing system engages local police with community leaders and
service providers in designing coordinated and targeted enforcement and preventive responses to
local crime patterns. In this model, police de-emphasize routine patrols that have questionable
effectiveness in crime control and devote more attention to analyzing crime patterns and finding
solutions to the problems that produce them.
Such initiatives in Richmond, Maine led to a focus on a small youth population and yielded
dramatic declines in the rate of reported crime--cutting it by two-thirds (Churchill, 1995). In
Portland, community policing initiatives have focused attention on the intersections between
poverty, public health, community disorder, and crime. One community policing center, for
example, works closely with the University of Southern Maine’s School of Nursing and the
Portland City Health Department to address a wide variety of interrelated community health and
service needs. Other Maine cities and towns pioneering in the use of community policing include
Biddeford, Brunswick, Lewiston, and South Portland.
Community policing efforts appear to succeed in controlling crime rates to the degree that they
create partnerships that strengthen local community institutions. For example, community
policing efforts may reduce public disorder and increase the number of families using public
places, assist in redeploying public resources for recreation programs that draw youths to
constructive activities, organize neighborhood residents to report suspicious acts and people to

the police, reinforce family control through the enforcement of curfews, and increase citizenpolice trust and cooperation (e.g. Sadd and Grinc, 1996). At a local level, community policing
integrates criminal justice approaches to crime with the work of schools, families, social service
agencies, town planners, and local community groups. It also recognizes the restorative justice
principle that crime control must be worked through locally in response to the needs and
characteristics of each community. By providing modest support for increased local training
and initiatives to further develop community policing, Maine policy makers could significantly
advance crime control and restorative justice.
The theory of community policing provides a model for other parts of the criminal justice
system--prosecutors, courts, and corrections. Like police, these agencies cannot succeed in crime
control--or in doing the work of restorative justice--without substantial connections to local
communities. For example, to the degree prosecutors see their role as helping to reduce crime
rates, they must try to find ways not simply to punish offenders, but also to build community
resources that enable offenders to remain in or to re-enter communities with supporting and
controlling connections to family, work, school, and supportive social and mental health
services. The same is true for courts where judges now sentence offenders to probation--which
has a caseload of over 9,000 juvenile and adult offenders--without any certainty that resources
exist to ensure that probation conditions for treatment and work can be met. Jail and prison
officials must find ways to connect the people
leaving their institutions to the communities they return to so social controls in them can operate
effectively. Restorative justice requires attention to rebuilding and strengthening communities.
Thus, for crime control and restorative justice to have a chance, criminal justice officials must
follow the lead of police in linking their work to the powerful forces for good in Maine
communities as well as to the resources of public and private agencies outside the traditional
criminal justice system.
What does all this mean more specifically in terms of other policy initiatives and models in
Maine? The first steps may be both conceptual and organizational. Criminal justice officials
must understand their roles more broadly and make connections at a policy-making level to
other public officials whose work relates to crime and crime prevention. The Children’s
Cabinet, chaired by Corrections Commissioner Joseph Lehman, provides a model for this sort of
coordination. Its charge is to develop a "seamless service delivery system for children and
families and . . . to pool funding to maximize limited resources." The creation of the Children’s
Cabinet recognizes the problem of divided responsibilities and the mandates of state agencies
that all work with the same target population. The same problem of divided services and
uncoordinated approaches exists in the area of criminal justice, where the population most at risk
is served by agencies with very little contact and coordination. For example, we know significant
segments of the jail population in Maine consist of individuals who draw heavily on local and
state social and mental health resources. This pattern suggests a need to coordinate what now are
almost totally separate activities of police, courts, prosecutors, probation officers, Department of
Human Services workers, mental health staff, substance abuse treatment professionals and
agencies working with the homeless. At the local level, police in Brunswick and Portland have
begun to model such programs.

The creation of the Maine Criminal Justice Commission2 has helped to improve communication
and coordination among disparate state-level agencies involved in criminal justice. Modest
support for working groups--for example, on mental health and criminal justice--coordinated by
this commission but drawing in other state-level agencies would provide a start in developing a
"seamless response" to those most at risk of contact with the criminal justice system--both
victims and offenders.
Maine needs to rely more heavily on intermediate sanctions--punishments between low
supervision probation and imprisonment (Morris and Tonry, 1990). During the past decade,
Maine has flirted with a more varied system of punishments that still promises to reduce reliance
on prison and strengthen the bonds between offenders and the communities in which they live.
Unhappily, restitution centers proposed in a bond issue fell victim to voter resistance to
spending, and intensive supervision probation foundered on its own too strict eligibility rules and
budget cutting within the Department of Corrections. Former Kennebec County Sheriff Frank
Hackett pioneered the use of community-service sanctions for drunk drivers--such as weekend
incarceration that included work on projects like painting local schools or cleaning up litter in
park areas--with great success, and that now is spreading slowly to other Maine counties.
However, Maine still relies heavily on prisons, jails, or traditional probation, and has remarkably
few alternative sanctions, especially for its significant number of non-violent offenders. While
there may be short-term increases in costs to make intermediate sanctions operative, Maine
policy makers need to promote these alternatives and overcome barriers to their use. A system of
intermediate sanctions, if used to divert some offenders from prison, could decrease long-term
corrections costs while providing more clearly graded punishments that help reconnect offenders
to communities and the controls they provide. Further, if guided by a restorative justice
paradigm, these intermediate punishments could help repair harm and ensure accountability of
the offender to victim and community.
Despite the widespread perception that citizens single-mindedly choose "locking up criminals
and throwing away the key," strong evidence exists that an educated public would support
further development of intermediate sanctions in Maine. For example, after learning a little bit
about the costs of imprisonment and the nature of these intermediate sanctions, 94 percent of a
cross-section of Mainers surveyed in 1992 indicated they favored the use of intermediate
sanctions for offenders who had not committed serious violent crimes (Market Decisions, 1992).
Courts, prosecutors, and corrections officials in Maine should expand their support of
restorative justice approaches that help to repair harm and respond to the needs of victims.
Maine now has a crazy quilt of programs for victims but little sense of a thoughtful and
coordinated approach to assisting crime victims, most of whom now must fend for themselves.
The shelter movement for abused women and the ten centers in Maine for victims of sexual
assault all reflect private nonprofit efforts to assist selected victims. The state also has a victim
compensation law that has paid out $500,000 during its first three years of operation, largely to
people who had suffered crime-related physical injury. Prosecutors and some police departments
have victim-witness advocates, although it is not clear that they are universally available. The
Department of Corrections recently hired its first Victim Services Coordinator. But Maine policy

makers need to think comprehensively about assistance to crime victims, identifying serious
gaps, needed resources, and potential improvements in services consistent with a restorative
justice philosophy.
In addition, police, prosecutors, and courts in Maine should be encouraged to promote the
selective use of victim-offender meetings (or mediation), which have been pioneered in this state
by the Community Dispute Resolution Center of Portland. These meetings presume an offender
who will take responsibility for the crime and a victim willing to meet, talk, and listen to the
offender in a safe setting. Victim-offender mediation has been going on in the U.S. since 1974,
and has been viewed as extremely successful by participants (Coates and Gehm, 1989). There is
even some evidence that participation may lower the likelihood that juvenile offenders will
return to crime (Umbreit and Coates, 1993).
Maine policy makers need to address the serious shortage of rehabilitation and assistance
programs for offenders in jails, prisons, and under probation supervision in the community.
Seventy-nine percent of Maine citizens believe that "with adequate treatment, most offenders can
be helped so they can be better citizens when they get out of prison" (Market Decisions, 1992).
Despite the clear sensibility of and support for rehabilitation, it typically has been hard hit by
cutbacks or constraints in both the Department of Corrections budget and in funding for
community-based programs. Thus, programs to deal with substance abuse and sex offending and
for job training, education, and counseling currently do not come close to serving the needs of
both imprisoned offenders and those on probation. Such programs have limited long-term effects
on behavior, unless offenders can forge new and constructive social bonds in their communities.
Contractions in the size of the probation staff during the early 1990s--while caseloads were
rising--have hampered their capacity to assist offenders upon their release from confinement.
Although Maine eliminated parole and post-release supervision in 1975, the heavy use of split
sentences, with probation following prison or jail provides a legal framework for supervising
offenders while they establish bonds to work, school, and family upon release. However, the lack
of staff resources in probation and community support services limits that possibility. Maine thus
needs to redevelop its rehabilitative programming for offenders in prison and on probation, as
well as its probation resources, if it hopes to make punishment an effective tool of crime control.3
The rehabilitative efforts in prisons and jails also should advance restorative justice by
highlighting the accountability of offenders to their victims and encouraging them to undertake
restitution in some form. Imprisonment in a retributive system demands that the offender pay a
"debt to society," but that debt often can be paid passively by "doing time." A restorative justice
system would actively encourage offenders to make amends, to earn money to pay back victims,
and to make contributions to their communities. Reparation could go far to connect offenders
positively to communities in ways that may help them reintegrate more successfully upon
release.
Finally, if Maine is to make serious strides toward crime control, it must plan carefully for
general prevention efforts that take place largely outside the purview of the criminal justice
system but should be coordinated with it. General prevention focuses either on individuals at
risk of offending or on the social processes or structures that produce delinquent and criminal
conduct. Prevention programs might include home visits and day care for poor single mothers,

training for parents whose young children "act out," and graduation incentives for disadvantaged
high school students. A recent study by RAND of such efforts underlines the potential of early
crime prevention efforts. It reports limited effects on crime rates of prison building and
incarceration and much more substantial impacts for each dollar expended on these sorts of
targeted crime prevention programs (Greenwood et al., 1996).
Maine needs to support and encourage statewide and local efforts to craft crime prevention
programs that recognize the varying character of crime and communities in the state. A serious
effort to examine evidence about crime patterns, to assess existing state and local resources for
intervening with groups such as at-risk youth and substance abusers, and to map strategies for
crime prevention would give the public evidence that crime was being taken seriously. The state
could set targets for measuring the effectiveness of such efforts and focus public attention on
potentially productive and cost-effective efforts at crime control. The leadership for such efforts
might come from working groups convened by the Criminal Justice Commission--but only if it
has increased resources.
Resources for Change: A Modest Proposal
An imaginative approach to Maine’s criminal justice policy runs counter to continuing budget
pressures that limit opportunities to start new initiatives while continuing old ones. Thus, even if
new approaches might prove less costly in the long run, they typically require start-up funds.
Legislators understandably are reluctant to commit such funds unless they can be certain these
investments will be paid back by future cost savings. How can Maine guarantee future cost
reductions in order to encourage the commitment of current resources to support significant
improvements in its capacity to control crime and to advance restorative justice?
The obvious target for such savings is the closure of a corrections facility. The Maine State
Prison at Thomaston, the state’s oldest and least efficient institution, provides the best possibility
(Rooks, 1996). With an annual operating cost of about $16 million, the state prison absorbs 20 to
25 percent of the Department of Corrections’ general fund budget. Its closure could be achieved
by a planned decrease in the total prison population through the increased use of intermediate
sanctions for non-violent offenders and by increasing the capacity of other existing correctional
facilities. For example, by investing capital in a small and lower-security addition to the "Super
Max" at Warren (including a kitchen and other central facilities), by adding capacity at the prison
farm across the road, and by adding a new medium-security living unit at the Maine Correctional
Center, the state could move some inmates to enlarged existing institutions. Because of
economies of scale at these other facilities and the efficiencies of new construction, such
additions would cost significantly less to operate per inmate. A modest expansion at the two
facilities in Warren also would reduce the economic impact on the Thomaston-Warren area with
the closure of the Maine State Prison. With its closure, the substantial operating costs of the
Maine State Prison could be diverted to pay for the increased costs of other institutions, a
dramatically enlarged program of intermediate sanctions, improved pre-release and post-release
services that would help offenders become reintegrated in their communities, modest efforts at
targeted crime prevention across the state, and significant initiatives to promote restorative
justice.

Conclusion
Maine and California have very different crime problems, but in many ways have adopted
similar strategies for dealing with them. Both states rely heavily on an expensive retributive
system to control crime and provide justice, and both tend to conceive of crime control as the
exclusive province of the criminal justice system. In neither state is there good evidence that
retributive approaches produce practical benefits--that they significantly affect crime rates by
deterrence and incapacitation. Without a high and rising rate of violent crime in Maine, however,
thus far we have avoided most of the excesses of escalating criminal penalties and prison
expenditures faced by California. Can we take advantage now of our relatively low crime rate to
rethink and improve crime control strategies and alter and enhance the nature of our justice
system?
It is clear that police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections personnel can by themselves do little
to bring about marginal reductions in crime rates. However, by recognizing the potential for
building connections between the relatively weak controls offered by the justice system and the
relatively powerful controls that exist in communities for those people who find rewards in
family, work, and school, Maine can enhance crime control. But that enhancement requires
change in the organization of criminal justice. It means new and improved linkages between
criminal justice and other agencies of government, private institutions, and individual citizens. It
means a serious commitment to community policing, development of intermediate sanctions,
serious investment in resources for treatment and rehabilitation in both prisons and communities,
and thoughtful, targeted crime prevention efforts. All these efforts can and should be organized
around what we know through research will work or offers the promise of working, and all need
to be monitored for their effects and effectiveness. To do the latter will require more serious
attention to coordinated computerized data systems that link police, courts, and corrections, as
well as modest investments in research and evaluation. Long-term funding for at least some of
these changes could come from a carefully planned closure of the Maine State Prison.
These efforts to achieve crime control make sense by themselves, but they also would advance
restorative justice in Maine. A commitment to restorative justice would free policy makers from
the trap of a single-minded commitment to retributive justice that can drive ineffective and costly
criminal justice policies. Just as important, such a commitment would encourage wider attention
to the needs of victims and to the reparation of the harm done by crimes, a peripheral focus of the
current offender-focused justice system.
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Endnotes:
1

For a period of time, ideas of "just desserts" and of "proportionality" in punishment helped to
restrain retribution. The revisions of the Maine Criminal Code that took effect in 1976 reflected
these views by setting out a carefully graded and limited set of punishments, presumably
proportional to the seriousness of the crime. Such restraint on the severity of punishment proves
hard to maintain in the face of pressures for increased retribution and hopes for marginal
increases in deterrence. Thus, Maine’s criminal code has been revised repeatedly during the last
twenty years, with increases of one penalty or another.
2

The Maine Criminal Justice Commission was created in 1991. The purpose of the commission
is "to monitor and evaluate the state’s criminal justice system on an ongoing basis and to provide
recommendations regarding changes in the system to the appropriate state departments and the
Legislature." Members include heads of all the relevant state agencies, including the attorney
general, chief justice, and commissioner of corrections. Lack of funding has
handicapped the commission from its inception, however. Although limited funding now
supports a part-time staff position, the commission’s resources are minimal, and it is neither
equipped to respond rapidly to questions raised in the Legislature or to set and pursue its own
agenda.
3

Efforts to build rehabilitation programs should be made in light of research evidence about
what works and what does not work. Ever since Lipton, Martinson and Wilks (1975) wrote their
important critique of correctional efforts at rehabilitation, researchers have been re-examining
their conclusion that "nothing works." There is increasing evidence that although no single
strategy works for all offenders, some rehabilitation efforts—for example, therapeutic
communities for drug offenders, treatment for some types of sex offenders, education programs
and so on--are relatively effective in the long run (e.g. Immarigeon, 1995; Wexler, 1995).
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